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Abstract 
The Extended Mind Thesis (EMT) is traditionally formulated against the bedrock of functionalism, 
and ongoing debates are typically bogged down with questions concerning the exact relationship 
between EMT and different versions of functionalism. In this paper, I offer a novel ally for EMT: 
the new mechanistic approach to explanation. I argue that the mechanistic framework provides 
useful resources not just to disambiguate EMT, and to show which objections fail to pose a serious 
challenge, but also to answer some of the deeper problems that stem from the functionalist roots of 
EMT. !
1. Introduction 
The Extended Mind Thesis (EMT), first proposed by Clark and Chalmers (1998), claims that the 
vehicles of our cognitive processes and mental states can and sometimes do extend beyond the 
boundaries of our brain and even body (cf. Clark, 2008, p. 76). If a physical object plays a part in 
the machinery realising a cognitive process, then that physical object is part of the cognitive 
process, no matter whether it is inside or outside the head. This is the so-called parity principle 
(Clark & Chalmers, 1998, p. 8), the heart and soul of EMT. 
 The most well-known illustration is the case of Otto and Inga. When Inga hears about a new 
exhibition at the Museum of Modern Art (MoMA) she retrieves from her biological memory that it 
is on 53rd Street and goes to the museum. Her counterpart, Otto, who suffers from a mild form of 
Alzheimer’s disease, uses a notebook to jot down and retrieve information. So when he hears about 
the exhibition he turns to his notebook, and retrieves the address from there. Clark and Chalmers 
argue that, just like Inga, Otto walks to the museum because “he wanted to go to the museum and 
believed (even before consulting his notebook) that it was on 53rd Street” (Clark, 2008, p. 78). Both 
Otto and Inga have the same long-term beliefs, it is just Otto’s beliefs are extended beyond his 
skull. 
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2. Objections to EMT 
EMT has been widely criticised in the literature. In what follows, I am going to focus on some of 
the most characteristic objections: a set of related issues raised by Adams and Aizawa (2001, 2009, 
2010a, 2010b), and an argument put forth by Mark Sprevak (2009).  
 First, Adams and Aizawa happily acknowledge that Otto’s notebook is causally coupled to the 
cognitive processes of Otto, but resist the further claim that the notebook is part of the relevant 
cognitive process. Clark and Chalmers, they argue, commit a coupling-constitution fallacy: they 
confuse causal interactions between Otto’s cognitive processes and the notebook with an extension 
of a cognitive process (Adams & Aizawa, 2010b, p. 68). 
 Clark and Chalmers support the constitution claim by emphasising that Otto’s notebook plays 
“roughly” (Clark, 2008, p. 76) the same functional role as Inga’s biological memory: their content 
are poised for the control of action, and interact with desires and other beliefs in roughly the same 
way. Adams and Aizawa agree. However, even if there is rough functional similarity, they argue, i.e. 
even if the coarse-grained functional profile of Otto’s notebook matches that of Inga’s biological 
memory, their fine-grained functional profiles are so vastly different (e.g. biological memories are 
dynamic systems prone to reorganisation, interpolation, creative mergers, etc., whereas notebooks 
are static storage devices) that Otto’s notebook does not deserve to be called cognitive at all. 
 For Adams and Aizawa, fine-grained functional descriptions are important, because they 
believe that “the cognitive must be discriminated on the basis of underlying causal 
processes” (Adams & Aizawa, 2001, p. 52). Only uncovering these underlying fine-grained causal 
regularities yields interesting causal laws. From this perspective, EMT, by relying on coarse-grained 
functional characterisations, and thus permitting nearly anything into the scope of cognitive science 
(e.g. a range of tools that humans can use as mnemonic aids), looses every chance to be able to 
uncover interesting regularities (Adams & Aizawa, 2001, p. 61). That is, cognitive science allowing 
for extended cognitive processes just ceases to be a science.  
 Relatedly, Sprevak (2009) draws attention to that EMT faces a dilemma: in order to allow for 
cases of extended cognition EMT needs to set the grain parameter (at which two functionally 
characterised processes are identical) coarse enough, but if the grain parameter is too coarse, it 
yields a radical version of EMT by permitting cases of extended cognition which even proponents 
of EMT would not allow for. 
 Clark and Chalmers realise that extra conditions are needed in order to make EMT more 
modest and plausible. They offer the following “rough-and-ready set of additional criteria to be met 
by nonbiological candidates for inclusion into an individual’s cognitive system”: (1) “That the 
resource be reliably available and typically invoked.”, (2) “That any information thus retrieved be 
more or less automatically endorsed [...] and deemed trustworthy”, (3) “That information contained 
in the resource should be easily accessible as and when required.”, and (4) “That the information in 
the notebook has been consciously endorsed at some point in the past and indeed is there as a 
consequence of this endorsement.” (Clark, 2008, p. 79; see also Clark & Chalmers, 1998, p. 17). 
 For Sprevak, this set of criteria is problematic because the conditions are unjustified: Clark 
and Chalmers remain silent about why this set is to be accepted. Sprevak argues that without 
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providing well-established conditions for designating an intermediate level grain size, which 
proponents of EMT fail to do, EMT will not be able to balance between the two extremes: radical-
EMT, where (at too coarse grain size) nearly any artefact could be seen as an extension of certain 
cognitive processes, and no-EMT, where (at too fine grain size) no artefacts would qualify as 
constitutive parts of cognitive processes. 
3. The New Mechanistic Framework 
Now that the stage is set, I turn my attention to demonstrating how the mechanistic framework 
(Bechtel, 2008; Craver, 2007; Machamer, et al., 2000) is able to help articulating the core idea 
behind EMT, and formulating systematic answers to the main objections. 
 The mechanistic approach identifies a phenomenon via identifying the causal roles played by         
a system producing the phenomenon, and accounts for this phenomenon in terms of the organised 
activity of the parts of the system. It is a multilevel approach—once the activity of an entity at a 
given level is decomposed into the lower level organised structure of its parts and their activities it 
is possible to apply the same methodology again in order to account for the lower level activities in 
terms of still lower levels, and so on. 
 If we apply this framework to the case of Inga and Otto, what we get is the following. Inga         
hears about an exhibition in MoMA and consequently she goes to the museum. This is the personal 
level phenomenon one can observe. Now in line with the mechanistic approach, it is possible to 
account for this phenomenon in terms of the organised activity of lower—arguably sub-personal—
level entities and activities: e.g. a speech recognition process analysing the auditory input, an act of 
mental recall searching Inga’s biological memory, an act of deliberate planning, and the activity of a 
motor control system moving Inga’s body-parts. One can, of course, dig deeper, to find out what 
still lower level entities and activities produce the activities of these now middle-level entities. For 
example, at a lower level one can describe neural mechanisms responsible for how Inga’s biological 
memory responds to recall processes and affects planning, and also for internal processes like 
consolidation, re-organisation, interpolation, and so on. 
 Similarly, when Otto hears about the exhibition in MoMA, he also goes to the right place. So         
the phenomenon as described at this personal level is the same. The underlying mechanism, 
however is different. Unlike in Inga’s case, where at the sub-personal level one can find an act of 
mental recall searching biological memory, in Otto’s case the set of sub-personal level entities and 
activities constituting the higher level phenomenon partly consists of an act of reaching for the 
notebook and reading from it. If one digs deeper, it turns out that Otto’s notebook is quite unlike 
Inga’s biological memory in the sense that it has no parts the activities of which would be 
responsible for such dynamic internal processes that are characteristic of biological memories. The 
notebook is a static storage device. 
4. EMT Disambiguated 
Distinguishing between these different levels helps systematising the problem space. Mental states 
typically get ascribed on the basis of personal (here: highest) level descriptions. Literally, neither 
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the sub-personal process of recalling from biological memory, nor reaching and reading from a 
physical notebook ‘has a belief’—or ‘is cognitive’ for that matter (cf. Adams & Aizawa, 2010b for 
claiming otherwise)—mainly because the terms ‘having a belief’ and ‘being cognitive’ belong to a 
vocabulary characterising the personal level, but not the lower levels. Sub-personal level entities 
and their activities contribute to ‘having believes’ or ‘being cognitive’ by constituting a mechanism 
that, as a whole, is responsible for these phenomena. 
 EMT focuses on these sub-personal (here: middle) level mechanisms. EMT does not commit         
the coupling-constitution fallacy because what EMT is really interested in are exactly those cases 
where a physical object does play a part in a sub-personal mechanism. According to the mechanistic 
framework, mere coupling happens when an entity is causally connected to parts of a given 
mechanism, but it does not contribute to the overall performance of the mechanism. Contrary to 
this, constitution happens when the entity in question, and its activities, do contribute to the overall 
performance of the mechanism. EMT here can even rely on the specific method the mechanistic 
framework provides for deciding whether a given entity is part of a mechanism: the method of 
mutual manipulability—the idea that lower level intervention and higher level detection combined 
with higher level intervention and lower level detection is able to locate mechanism boundaries 
(Craver, 2007, pp. 152-160). 
 Interestingly, the top-down manipulability constraint readily disqualifies many of the famous         
counterexamples (e.g. me having standing beliefs about whatever I could find in Encyclopaedia 
Britannica, or calculate with a supercomputer, etc.), in which cases wiggling the whole mechanism 
would not necessarily wiggle the content or state of the artefact (cf. Craver, 2007, p. 153) due to 
lack of true read-write integration (as in the case of the Encyclopaedia Britannica), or constant and 
reliable access (as in the case of a supercomputer). 
 Note that some of the extra conditions Clark and Chalmers impose on EMT aim at         
disqualifying exactly these cases—e.g. (4) argues for true read-write integration, whereas (1) for 
constant and reliable access. 
 Other conditions—e.g. (2) arguing for automatic endorsement and trustworthiness, or Clark’s         
returning emphasis that what matters from the point of view of EMT is “the achieved functional 
poise of the stored information” (cf. e.g. Clark, 2008, p. 88)—characterise the ‘forward looking 
causal profile’ (cf. Shoemaker, 2007) of the entities within the mechanism, i.e. how they affect other 
parts of the mechanism (e.g. how the notebook affects planning and ultimately motor control). 
Without these latter conditions, bottom-up style manipulability would fail, since if these relations 
were not in place (e.g. if the information stored was not trusted) wiggling the part would not 
necessarily wiggle the whole. 
 That is, the mechanistic framework helps us recognise that—contra Sprevak’s (2009) charge,        
—the extra set of criteria proposed in order to avoid radical EMT is in fact well-founded: it is an 
alternative formulation of mutual manipulability, i.e. Clark and Chalmers’ way of getting a grip on 
the constitution relation. 
 Next, note that EMT does not need to be concerned with the levels below the highest sub-        
personal (here: middle) level. The details about the entities and their activities at lower levels are 
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irrelevant from the perspective of the mechanism EMT focuses on. The only thing that matters is 
whether entities at this (middle) level contribute to a mechanism that as a whole produces the 
cognitive phenomenon in question. That is, Otto’s notebook extends Otto’s cognitive processes as 
far as it partly constitutes a mechanism that produces the same cognitive phenomenon that is also 
produced by the mechanism partly constituted by Inga’s biological memory. The fine-grained 
functional profile of Otto’s notebook does not need to match that of Inga’s biological memory in 
order to have that. 
 Abstracting away from features of lower level implementation, contrary to what opponents of 
EMT claim, does not render EMT unscientific. First, EMT does not permit nearly anything into the 
scope of cognitive science—only those entities and activities that constitute the mechanisms EMT 
is interested in. Second, EMT does yield interesting causal regularities at this level (even if not at 
the levels below). 
 This is the very message of EMT: there are interesting causal regularities one can uncover 
when one investigates how the organised activity of (high level) sub-personal entities produces 
personal level phenomena. These regularities are insensitive to differences in lower level 
implementation, and most importantly, they sometimes span through the internal-external divide.  
5. Conclusion 
This paper argues that the mechanistic framework provides useful resources for proponents of EMT. 
Besides helping to articulate the core idea behind EMT, and revealing why objections based on the 
coupling-constitution fallacy style arguments trivially fail to pose a serious challenge for EMT, the 
mechanistic framework also offers a natural solution to the problem of how to set the grain size of 
the functional descriptions EMT relies on, and provides reasons for accepting the extra criteria that 
are typically imposed on EMT by its proponents as necessary amendments to general functionalism. 
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